Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ American Express, Inc.: The Enforceability of Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Brokerage Firm Contracts by Robertson, Jean Rowley
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.:
The Enforceability of Predispute Arbitration Clauses in
Brokerage Firm Contracts
I. INTRODUCTION
In the literary world of poetry and novels, a scarlet "A" represents the
act of adultery. In the legal world of securities regulation the "scarlet
letter" represents an entirely different taboo. Many investors believe the
"scarlet letter" should be worn by brokerage firms that incorporate
predispute arbitration clauses in their customer account investment
agreements.' In the twentieth century, however, people do not wear scar-
let letters. Times have changed. We are currently living in a society
where many taboos either have been accepted or no longer exist. With
the decision of Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.2 the United States Supreme Court took the opportunity to eliminate
one more legal taboo: the belief that disputes involving the sale of securi-
ties can only be competently resolved in a court of law and not by
arbitration.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Supreme Court's decision
in Rodriguez and its impact on the arbitration of securities law disputes.
The Note is organized into four parts. Part I is a general introduction to
the relevant legislative and caselaw background of arbitrating securities
disputes. Part II discusses the evolution of arbitrating securities disputes
in the recent Supreme Court and circuit court decisions that led to the
Court's granting certiorari to Rodriguez. Part III is a close examination
of the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez and its ramifications in
1. In July 1988, the North Americah Securities Administrators Association [NASAA]
proposed a model rule that would restrict mandatory arbitration. NASAA stated that it
intended to accomplish two goals with its model rule: (1) ban mandatory arbitration as a
precondition for participation by individuals buying securities, anq (2) balance the needs
and rights of the securities industry.and the investors. The proposed model rule called for
the prohibition of all predispute clauses in written customer agreements and that all arbi-
tration agreements be set out in a document separate from the standard written customer
agreement. NASAA Securities Arbitration Reform Proposal, at 1. Massachusetts passed
legislation, to become effective January 1, 1989, that would require brokers to provide
Massachusetts investors with a choice in the signing of arbitration clauses when they en-
tered into customer agreements. On December 19, 1988, the U.S. District Court of Massa-
chusetts enjoined the Secretary of State of Massacusetts from enforcing the security regu-
lations. The court held that the Massachusetts regulations were preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act and that they violated the supremacy clause of the Constitution of the
United States, Securities Indus. Assoc. v. Connolly, 703 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D. Mass.
1988).
2. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989),
vacating as moot, 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1988).
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the securities industry. Finally, this Note concludes in Part IV that
predispute arbitration agreements are properly enforceable in claims
arising out of the Securities Exchange Act, and that the Supreme
Court's decision in Rodriguez to overrule previous precedent against ar-
bitrating securities disputes3 was correct.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
In order to understand the impact that arbitration has had on securi-
ties litigation, an understanding of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
and its creation is paramount.' Arbitration is nothing new. Judicial his-
tory describes American courts as clinging to the English courts' tradi-
tional aversion to arbitration, which consider it an usurpation of judicial
power.5 In 1925, Congress took its first deliberate step toward establish-
ing a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration by enacting the FAA.$
Sections two and three of the FAA bear directly upon predispute arbi-
tration agreements. Section two of the FAA provides that a written pro-
vision in a contract to arbitrate any dispute arising out of that contract
shall be deemed "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" to the same extent
as any other provision of that contract, subject only to certain jurisdic-
tional limitations.7 Congress' intent behind this language was to codify
3. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see infra notes 13-20, 60-73 and acompanying
text.
4. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as arended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)).
5. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 n.4 (1974); Malcoljn & Segall,
The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under Section 10(b) of the Securities ENchange Act:
Should Wilko Be Extended?, 50 ALB. L. REv. 725, 728 (1986). See L. Loss, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 1024-25 (2d ed. 1988). "In England before the Compa-
nies Act of 1900 the courts honored stipulations that bound the purchasers to waive the
statutory liabilities as long as the stipulations were not too ["tricky."] Since the turn of the
century, however, this ready means of evasion has been unavailable in England .... "
6. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (stat-
ing that the Federal Arbitration Act, enacted in 1925, reversed centuries of judicial hostil-
ity toward arbitration agreements). Congress wanted to find a method to promote arbitra-
tion because of the congestion in the courts. Precedent was too firmly entrenched to be
overturned by the judiciary, so legislation [the FAA] was enacted. H.R.REP. No.96, 68th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1924).
7. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982):
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
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the common law duty of courts to enforce the terms of a valid contract.8
In fact, the congressional committee that adopted the FAA explained:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the
bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement. He
can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it becomes disadvanta-
geous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as
other contracts, where it belongs.'
According to the FAA, federal courts may not exercise any discretion
when determining whether there is a valid written agreement that gov-
erns a claim for arbitration."0 The reviewing court may only decide
whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties and
whether the claim before the court is in fact governed by the agree-
ment." If a federal court determines that a valid agreement exists, it
must compel arbitration and stay court proceedings pending
arbitration. 2
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
8. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.7 (1985) (The FAA "cre-
ates no new legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in
commercial contracts .. ") (quoting 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924)).
9. H.R. REP. No.96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess., 1-2 (1924).
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1982) (The FAA mandates that courts "shall" direct the parties to
arbitrate issues covered by the arbitration agreement).
I1. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). See Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850,
854 (11 th Cir. 1986) ("[A] court may not order arbitration until it is satisfied that a valid
arbitration agreement exists .... Any claim of fraud, duress, or qnconscionability in the
formation of the arbitration agreement is a matter for judicial consideration .... Allega-
tions of unconscionability in the contract as a whole, however, are matters to be resolved in
arbitration."); See, e.g., Gait v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1967).
12. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982):
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
.any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitra-
tion, the court ... upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or pro-
ceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had.
Section 4 requires the court to decide the arbitrability of a qlaim and "upon being satis-
fied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is
not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement." See also Sterk, Enforceability of Agree-
ments to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV.
481, 488 (1981).
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B. The Supreme Court's Treatment of the FAA
In 1953, the Supreme Court continued to harbor reservations about
the applicability of the FAA. Its decision that year in Wilko v. Swan1"
reflected the Court's suspicion of the competence of arbitral tribunals
and the desirability of arbitration.14
In Wilko, the Supreme Court faced an issue that required it to decide
whether a dispute under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 193315
(Securities Act), clearly arbitrable under the FAA, should be resolved by
arbitration or by a court. The Court was confronted with two different
Acts with "[tiwo policies, not easily reconcilable:" the desire to provide
"an opportunity generally to secure prompt, economical and adequate
solution to controversies" under the FAA on the one hand, and the desire
to protect the rights of investors under the Securities Act on the other."8
The FAA states that written arbitration agreements are valid and en-
forceable, and therefore, a court must comply with the arbitration agree-
ment and stay any trial of the issues referable to arbitration. 7 On the
other hand the Securities Act expresses the intention of Congress to void
any agreement that waives compliance with any provisions of the Securi-
ties Act."
The Court ultimately resolved this policy conflict in favor of the Se-
curities Act. 9 The Court's rationale was that the statutory right to select
a judicial forum was the kind of "provision" that Congress "must have
intended" to be nonwaivable, and that the customer's agreement to arbi-
trate future disputes arising under the Securities Act was therefore
void.20
Since Wilko, however, more recent Court decisions have amplified the
full intent and focus of the FAA.21 The Court has judicially recognized
the existence of a "national policy favoring arbitration," 22 and this na-
.tional policy is what has caused an increasing number of courts to finally
understand and enforce the strong congressional intent favoring arbitra-
tion agreements.2 3 Many cases decided by the Supreme Court involved
13. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
14. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987).
15. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
16. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438.
17. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
19. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-37.
20. Id.
21. See. e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1984); Moses H. Cone Me-
morial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
22. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10.
23. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
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arbitration issues, and consequently, in order to protect Congress' desire
to enforce valid arbitration agreements, the Court created significant
substantive law in defining the FAA.
In 1983, the Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp.24 affirmed its disapproval of the judiciary's past hos-
tility toward arbitration as an alternative to the courts. The Court in
Moses H. Cone held that a federal court was required by the FAA to
compel arbitration even though a prior suit was pending in a state court
for a declaratory judgment that the dispute was not subject to arbitra-
tion.25 The Court's ruling was based on the rationale that the FAA rep-
resents a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" which
creates a liberal "body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, appli-
cable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the [FAA]." 26
In addition, the Court asserted that "the [FAA] establishes that, as a
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable is-
sues should be resolved in favor of arbitration .... -27
Relying on its rationale in Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court later
decided in Southland Corp. v. Keating8 that the FAA preempted state
courts from limiting arbitration. In Southland, the Court overturned a
California state court decision that the arbitration agreement at issue
could not be enforced because a California statute existed that invali-
dated such arbitration agreements.2 9
In 1985, the Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.30 held in favor of arbitration in two very important cir-
cumstances. The Court's opinion first established that claims founded
upon statutes can be arbitrated.31 Justice Blackmun in his opinion for the
majority stated, "[t]he [FAA] provides no basis for disfavoring agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable
inquiry into arbitrability."'3 This analysis was then reinforced by the
Court's rejection of the respondent's argument that claims under the an-
titrust laws should be resolved in a court based on public policy concerns.
The Court held that antitrust claims can be resolved by arbitration even
24. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 3.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 24.
27. Id. at 24-25. ("[The FAA] requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give
effect to an arbitration agreement." Id. at 20. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original)).
28. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
29. Id. at 3. "Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person ac-
quiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or
order hereunder is void." Id. at 10 (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977)).
30. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
31. Id. at 614-I5.
32. Id. at 627.
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though "[tihe treble-damages provision wielded by the private litigant is
a chief tool in the antitrust enforcement scheme, posing a crucial deter-
rent to potential violators.""3
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon3 4 the Court in
1987 held that its decision in Wilko "was expressly based on the Court's
belief that a judicial forum was needed to protect the substantive rights
created by the Securities Act" and that arbitration was inadequate to
enforce those rights.35 Thus, the Court held in McMahon that Wilko
must be read as barring waiver of a judicial forum only where arbitra-
tion is inadequate to protect and enforce the statutory rights at issue.36
In the Court's review of the arbitrability of claims under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), it decided it could no longer
justify the Wilko Court's doubts concerning-the effectiveness of arbitra-
tion: "[T]he mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko
opinion in 1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration
that has prevailed since that time."'37
Given the Court's position in McMahon, it appeared that if Wilko
were read as barring arbitration of all Securities Act claims, lower courts
would continue to apply a rule which the Court carved away to practi-
cally nothing. That situation compelled many courts to reconcile Wilko
and McMahon by concluding that the Court in McMahon intended to
preclude arbitration of Securities Act claims only where there was a
showing that arbitration could not adequately protect those claims.38
33. Id. at 635. The Mitsubishi Court set out to reinforce the arbitration policies and to
quiet the fear of arbitration set out in Wilko. The Court stated: "'We are well past the
time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the competence of arbi-
tral tribunals should inhibit enforcement of the Act ... ' Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27). Accord Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (the FAA "is a congressional declaration
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration. . . [and] questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration"); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 10 (1984) (in passing the FAA, "Congress declared a na-
tional policy favoring arbitration. . .[that] mandated the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments"); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974). See also Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (i[t]here is nothing in the
record.. .to indicate that the arbitral system.. .would not afford the plaintiff the rights to
which he is entitled") (footnote omitted).
34. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220.
35. Id. at 228.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 233.
38. The Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have stated that the rationale under-
lying McMahon renders agreements to arbitrate § 12(2) claims presently enforceable. See
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.), rehg en
banc denied, 850 F.2d 1582 (1988) (per curiam); Peterson v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 849 F.2d 464, 466 (10th Cir. 1988); DeKuyper v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 695 F.
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C. The Securities Act of 1933
In direct response to the 1929 stock market crash, Congress enacted
federal legislation to regulate the sale of securities and to require com-
plete disclosure in the registration of securites with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). 39 The Securities Act was designed to pro-
tect the investing public from any imbalance in information between a
company selling its securities and the investor.4 0 Primarily, the Securities
Act regulates the issuers, underwriters, and dealers engaged in the sale
of securities.4 1 The safeguards of the Securities Act require the seller of
securities to file a registration statement with the SEC and to make full
disclosure of all material facts surrounding the offering.42 Section 12(2)
of the Securities Act extends its investor protection by creating express
liability for the sale of securities by means of false or misleading infor-
mation.43 This provision grants the investor a right to recover against a
broker if there was any fraud committed or misrepresentations made by
the broker during a sale."
Section 12(2) is enforced by means of section 22(a) of the Securities
Act, which is a jurisdictional provision that allows an investor to seek
enforcement of a section 12(2) claim in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion.4 5 This right provides the investor with all the advantages normally
Supp. 1367 (D. Conn. 1987), a ffd upon reconsideration, N-85-529 (EBB) (D. Conn. Nov.
23, 1988); Kavouras v. Visual Prod. Sys., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Hallal
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 88 C 2405 (N.D. 111. Dec. 13, 1988);
Ryan v. Liss, Tenner & Goldberg Securities Corp., 683 F. Supp. 480 (D.N.J. 1988).
39. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). See, e.g., Note, Mixed Arbitrable
and Nonarbitrable Claims in Securities Litigation: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 34
CAmT. U.L. REv. 525, 531-32 (1985).
40. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).
41. Id.; Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 113-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
42. Wilko v.-Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431. The Securities Act states that any person who
• ..offers or sells a security... by the use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth
or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be
liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in
equity in any court or competent jurisdiction ...." 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
43. Section 12(2) provides the investor with a "special right" to recover for misrepresen-
tation by the seller of a security; see also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). Any suit brought under the Securities Act may be brought in
the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in
the district where the offer or sale took place, if the defendant participated therein and
process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is Ln
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.
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afforded in an action brought in federal court, including a broad choice
of venue and the availability of nationwide service of process."" Section
12(2) also implements three significant modifications to common law ac-
tions for fraud and misrepresentation: (1) it provides a statutory cause of
action; (2) it gives a damaged buyer a wide choice of forum and venue,
both state and federal; and (3) it changes the burden of proof from the
buyer to the seller.4 7 Finally, to further protect the investing public, the
Securities Act ostensibly voids any attempt to circumvent or waive any
of its provisions.4 8
D. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Exchange Act expands the federal regulation of the sale of securi-
ties in the Securities Act.4 9 The Exchange Act regulates the markets in
which securities are traded subsequent to their initial sale in an attempt
to protect investors against stock price manipulation." For instance, sec-
tion 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for a seller of any
security to engage in any fraudulent or deceitful practice."1 Moreover,
the Exchange Act prohibits the employment of untrue statements of ma-
terial fact or the failure to state a material fact necessary to make a
statement not misleading in light of the circumstances in which it was
made during the sale of any security.
5 2
The Supreme Court has stated that the Exchange Act and the Securi-
ties Act should be considered together; they should be read as one when-
ever possible. There are, however, significant differences in the policy
46. Id.; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224-25 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 77n. See A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38
(1941).
49. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
50. H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1934); see Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
52. Id.; see generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-201 (discussion of
scienter requirement in an action for damages under § 10(b)).
53. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727-30 (1975). (Both of the
Acts constitute interrelated components of a federal regulatory scheme for securities); see
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and statutory construction of the two Acts. For instance, the language in
the two Acts is different. In the Exchange Act, neither section 10(b) nor
rule 1 Ob-5, promulgated thereunder, has an express provision for a statu-
tory cause cf action." Both section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 provide only
that it is unlawful to engage in the proscribed conduct. 55 Thus, a private
cause of action for a purchaser who has allegedly been injured by a vio-
lation of section 10(b)'s provisions must be judicially implied.58 Section
12(2) of the Securities Act, however, expressly provides for a private
cause of action.
5 7
While the Exchange Act is intended to protect the public, its primary
focus is on the creation and maintenance of an efficient and orderly capi-
tal market 5 8 The Exchange Act manifested Congress' fear that U.S.
capital, needed by the depression era economy, would be driven offshore
unless action was taken to stabilize the U.S. securities markets. 59
III. TREATMENT OF ARBITRATION IN THE COURTS
A. Wilko v. Swan
In 1950, the plaintiff in Wilko signed a contract with. a securities bro-
kerage firm that contained a predispute arbitration clause.60 In 1951, af-
ter the stock purchased by the plaintiff was sold at a loss, the plaintiff
filed a complaint alleging that he had been induced by his broker to
also S.E.C. v. Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co.,
287 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
54. Comment, The Case for Domestic Arbitration of Federal Securities Claims: Is the
Wilko Doctrine Still Valid?, 16 Sw. U.L. REv. 619 (1986).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240. Rule lOb-5:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
56. See. e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (White, J. con-
curring); see generally Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627
(1963).
57. 15 U.S.C. §. 77(a) (1982); see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (the statute's stated purpose is "to remove impediments to and
perfect mechanisms ... to ensure maintenance of fair and honest markets ... 
59. S. REP. No. 47, 73rd. Cong., Ist Sess. I (1933).
60. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 429 (1953).
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purchase 1,600 shares of stock based on false representations made by
the broker and that he suffered a loss on his investment as a result of the
broker's misrepresentation and other omissions of information.6 The
plaintiff brought his claim for damages under section 12(2) of the Secur-
ities Act in the district court. 62 The defendants moved to stay a trial on
the merits of the action pursuant to section 3 of the FAA."3
The district court' denied the stay pending arbitration and the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.6" The Supreme Court in turn
reversed the court of appeals and held in a seven-to-two decision that the
arbitration agreement was void under section 14 of the Securities Act. 6
The Court reasoned that section 14 represented the congressional intent
to prohibit forum selection agreements such as predispute arbitration
clauses.67 The Court's decision seemed to be based on the belief that
arbitration was deficient and thus not capable of protecting the rights
afforded by section 12(2) of the Securities Act. The Wilko Court be-
lieved that arbitrators were not capable of making "subjective findings
on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violat[ion] of [section 12(2)
and cannot make legal conclusions] without judicial instruction on the
law."'6 8 The Court also stated that arbitration in and of itself was an
inadequate method of protecting statutory rights because an arbitration
award may be made without a complete record of the arbitration pro-
ceedings. 69 Finally, the Court was not satisfied that the grounds for judi-
cial review of an arbitration award were sufficient because the power to
vacate the award is limited and it cannot be appealed.70
Thirty-six years ago, Wilko stood for the proposition that a predispute
agreement to arbitrate an express cause of action under section 12(2)
was void.71 Since 1953, however, the Supreme Court's decisions involving
securities arbitration have represented a continuous reassessment of its
61. Id.
62. Id. at 428.
63. Id. at 429 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3 (Sup. V 1952)) (current version at 9 U.S.C. § 3
(1982)).
64. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
65. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
66. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). Section 14 provides "[a]ny condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance
with any provision of this subchapter or the rules and regulations of the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission shall be void."
67. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438.
68. Id. at 435-36.
69. Id. at 436.
70. Id. at 436-37.
71. Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 405 (1987).
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position in Wilko. 7 The Court's primary rationale for upholding arbitra-
tion is that arbitration is appropriate under certain circumstances based
on the FAA. Presently, the Court's interpretation of section 12(2) of the
Securities Act prohibits only predispute agreements waiving substantive
liability.73
B. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.
The Supreme Court began chipping away at Wilko in Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co.7 4 In Scherk, the American company Alberto-Culver
decided to expand its overseas operations by purchasing a German enter-
prise and its trademarks.7 5 The two companies negotiated and signed a
contract whereby Scherk guaranteed that the trademarks were unencum-
bered .7 In addition, the contract contained an arbitration clause refer-
ring all controversies or claims to the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris, France.
77
Within a year after the agreement, Alberto-Culver discovered that the
trademarks were subject to substantial encumbrances and sought to re-
scind the contract.7 8 When Scherk refused the rescission, Alberto-Culver
sued in federal court alleging misrepresentations in violation of rule lOb-
5 of the Exchange Act.7 1 Scherk sought to stay the federal court pro-
ceedings pending arbitration pursuant to the agreement.8" The district
court entered an order refusing to stay arbitration and the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Wilko.8 1 The Supreme Court
ultimately reversed, holding that "[t]he exception to the clear provisions
of the FAA carved out by Wilko is simply inapposite to a case such as
the one before us."8
2
In its analysis, the Supreme Court distinguished Wilko by creating a
special niche for predispute arbitration agreements in the international
arena. 83 The Court explained that the "crucial difference" between
Scherk and Wilko was the fact that Scherk involved an international
72. Id. at 408.
73. Id. at 405.
74. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).




79. Id. at 509.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 510.
82. Id. at 517.
83. Id. at 510.16.
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agreement. Such a contract involves considerations and policies of com-
munication, comity, fairness, and commerce significantly different from
those found controlling in Wilko.84 This type of international agreement
precludes the possibility that one of the parties will be forced to press his
claim in an inconvenient or hostile forum, or a forum unfamiliar with the
subject matter of the dispute.85
After Scherk, trial courts usually ignored the Court's distinction be-
tween the express rights under the Securities Act and the implied rights
in the Exchange Act and continued to apply Wilko to implied rights of
action cases.86 These lower courts interpreted Scherk as carving out a
very narrow exception to Wilko. 7
C. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd
The congressional policy favoring arbitration under the FAA found
further support in the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.8 In 1981, A. Lamar Byrd invested $160,000 in
securities through Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. Before purchasing the se-
curities, Byrd signed Dean Witter Reynolds' standard Customer's Agree-
ment which stated that "[a]ny controversy between you and the under-
signed arising out of or relating to this contract or breach thereof, shall
be settled in arbitration."8
Seven months after Byrd made the investment, the value of his ac-
count dropped more than $100,000.0 Byrd filed a complaint against
Dean Witter in federal court alleging violations of sections 10(b), 15(c),
and 20 of the Exchange Act, and various state law provisions. 1 These
securities violations were the alleged result of several incidents. First,
Byrd alleged that the Dean Witter Reynolds agent traded in his accounts
without Byrd's prior consent; that the transactions executed within
Byrd's account were excessive; and that the status of his account had
84. Id. at 515.
85. Id at 516.
86. As one commentator has observed, lower courts' repeated attempts to limit Scherk
have "grossly misconstrued both the majority opinion in that case and the inclinations of
the present Supreme Court. Judicial attempts to limit Scherk generally have taken two
forms. First, some courts state that Scherk carved out a narrow exception to the Wilko
doctrine for international agreements." Fletcher, supra note 71, at 412.
87. Id.
88. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
89. Id. at 215.
90. Id. at 214.
91. Exchange Act §§ 78j(b), 78o(c), and 78(t) (1982).
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been misrepresented to him. Finally, Byrd alleged the agent acted with
Dean Witter Reynolds' knowledge, participation, and ratification. 92
Dean Witter Reynolds filed a motion to sever and compel the state law
claims and to stay arbitration of those claims pending resolution of the
federal court action.93 Seemingly, as though relying on the Wilko doc-
trine, Dean Witter Reynolds failed to make any attempt to compel arbi-
tration of the Exchange Act claims.94 This failure to compel arbitration
resulted in the issue not being properly before the Court.95
The district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the
motion to compel arbitration, and applied the doctrine of "intertwin-
ing."196 This doctrine applies to situations in which arbitrable and nonar-
bitrable claims in the same transaction are factually and legally interre-
lated. Thus, because the claims cannot easily be separated, they are
heard together before one court.97 In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme
Court reversed and rejected the doctrine of "intertwining" in strong lan-
guage that affirmed the FAA mandate that predispute arbitration agree-
ments be enforced. The Court believed the "intertwining" doctrine to
be inconsistent with the FAA because the FAA requires "piecemeal"
litigation if both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims are present.99
D. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon
The final case in this line of securities arbitration decisions is Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon.""° In McMahon, Eugene and
Julia McMahon, the respondents, were customers of Shearson/American
Express, Inc. under a customer agreement that required any controversy
relating to their accounts to be arbitrated.' 0' In October 1984, the
92. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 214.
93. id. at 215.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 215-16 n.l.
96. Id. at 216. Applied in the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, the doctrine of "in-
tertwining" precluded arbitration of otherwise arbitrable claims when a sufficient degree of
intertwining was shown. These courts justified application of the intertwining doctrine upon
the judicial efficiency achieved by avoiding bifurcated proceedings. See. e.g., Raiford v.
Buslease, 745 F.2d 1419 (11th Cir. 1984).
97. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216-17 (1985).
98. Id. at 217. The Court relied heavily on its decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. as follows: "[The FAA] requires piecemeal resolution
when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement." Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (emphasis in original).
99. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (citing Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20-21).
100. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
101. Id. at 222-23. The arbitration clause provided:
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McMahons filed a complaint in district court against Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, Inc. and its registered representative handling their ac-
counts, alleging violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 of the Ex-
change Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO). 102 The district court judge determined that the McMahons
must arbitrate all claims except the RICO claim. 103 On cross appeals,
the Second Circuit reversed in part, and affirmed in part, holding that
neither the Exchange Act nor the RICO claims were arbitrable.""
Justice O'Connor, speaking for the five-to-four majority, refused to ap-
ply the rationale behind Wilko in denying arbitration to claims arising
under the Exchange Act because the Wilko Court's interpretation of the
antiwaiver provision of the Securities Act was based on the Court's mis-
trust of arbitration.' 0 5 The majority found it "difficult to reconcile
Wilko's mistrust of the arbitral process with this Court's subsequent de-
cisions involving the [FAA]."' 6
Another very important part of the Court's rationale was its interpre-
tation of the arbitrability of the Exchange Act claims.10 7 In Wilko, the
Court stated that the antiwaiver provision of the Securities Act prohib-
ited waivers of one's rights to a judicial forum."0 8 The McMahon Court,
however, established that this was a misreading of the antiwaiver provi-
sion of the Securities Act, and that in fact, both the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act do nothing more than prohibit waivers of substantive
liability under the Acts. 09 This interpretation of Wilko made it easy for
the Court to decide McMahon and was dispositive when it subsequently
decided Rodriguez.
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or
relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules, then in
effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Di-
rectors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Ex-
change, Inc. as I may elect.
102. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 618 F. Supp. 384 (1985).
103. Id.
104. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986).
105. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228:
The conclusion in Wilko was expressly based on the Court's belief that a judicial
forum was needed to protect the substantive rights created by the Securities Act...
• Wilko must be understood, therefore, as holding that the plaintiff's waiver of the
"right to select the judicial forum" .... , was unenforceable only because arbitration
was judged inadequate to enforce the statutory rights created by section 12(2).
106. Id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107. Id. at 229.
108. Id at 228-29.
109. Id at 229.
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E. Circuit Split Since McMahon
The continued viability of Wilko was called into question by several
lower courts since the Court's opinion in McMahon seemed to under-
mine Wilko's rationale. The courts were left to choose between the ratio-
nales of Wilko and McMahon, and then cross their fingers and hope they
made the correct choice. In Chang v. Lin,1" 0 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals followed the rationale in Wilko and refused to enforce a predis-
pute arbitration clause in a customer agreement between the plaintiffs
and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. In the Second Circuit's de-
cision, the court explained that although the Supreme Court had ques-
tioned the Wilko doctrine in its McMahon opinion, until the Supreme
Court officially overruled Wilko, the Second Circuit would continue to
refuse to enforce of predispute arbitration clauses under section 12(2) of
the Securities Act.11' The Third Circuit Court of Appeals came to the
same conclusion in its decision in Osterneck v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc."'
These two appellate court decisions directly contradicted the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Rodriguez. The court in Rodriguez believed that the
McMahon decision mandated the enforcement of valid predispute arbi-
tration agreements under section 12(2) of the Securities Act because
"McMahon undercuts every aspect of Wilko" and "a formal overruling
of Wilko, appears inevitable -- or, perhaps, superfluou ' '.""' The Fifth
Circuit was not alone. The Tenth Circuit, in Peterson v. Shearson/Amer-
ican Express, Inc., also recognized that applying the rationale in McMa-
hon to section 12(2) claims renders predispute arbitration agreements
valid and enforceable.1 4 Notwithstanding Wilko, the court of appeals
stated in Peterson that "[fin McMahon, the Supreme Court essentially
overruled Wilko ... [i]n so doing, the Court recognized arbitration as an
acceptable method of dispute resolution under the [Exchange Act] ."5
A direct conflict among the circuit courts as to whether McMahon or
Wilko presently governs the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate
section 12(2) claims clearly existed. The circuit courts, as well as district
and state courts, continued to hold that either the rationale underlying
110. Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987).
11. Id. at 222.
112. Osterneck v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 841 F.2d 508 (3d Cir.
1988).
113. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1298 (5th
Cir 1988) (citing Noble v. Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849, 850 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1987)).
114. Peterson v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 849 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1988).
115. Id. at 466.
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McMahon presently governs the securities arbitration, or that Wilko
controls until the Supreme Court expressly overrules the case. 116 With-
out the Supreme Court's definitive resolution of this issue in Rodriguez,
courts all over the country would have continued to contradict one an-
other and litigants would have continued to forum shop and be unaware
of what their rights really were under section 12(2) of the Exchange Act.
F. Considerations for the Court in Rodriguez
1. Legislation Since McMahon. Individual investors are skeptical
about participating in capital markets they perceive to be dominated by
institutions and insiders, believing the markets may even be rigged
against them. 117 Investor confidence has been at an all-time low after the
events of October 1987, and the attendant rise in market volatility. As a
result, the Supreme Court knew that its decision in Rodriguez would
send signals to both the small individual investor and the broker.
The Court's decision to apply McMahon's rationale to claims under
section 12(2) of the Securities Act may be interpreted by individual in-
vestors to mean that there is no longer a safe place for them irl the capi-
tal market. An estimated 4,100 investors filed for arbitration of securities
lIws claims in 1987.118 This was up from an estimated total of 800 inves-
tors who sought similar relief in 1980."1 Arbitration was therefore up by
more than 500 percent since 1980. This increase was the direct result of
two key events: (1) the October 1987 stock market "crash," afid (2) the
McMahon decision in June 1987.120 The market crash was eslimated to
result in at least a fifty percent increase in arbitration filings, and the
McMahon decision was hailed by the securities industry as a "green
light" for brokerage firms to include mandatory arbitration clauses in
practically all written customer agreements.'21 It is clear that there is a
very important need for a workable arbitral system in the securities
industry.
Among state legislatures, Massachusetts was the first to respond to
this national rise in securities arbitration. Shortly after the Supreme
Court announced its McMahon decision, the Massachusetts Secretary of
116. Respondents' Brief at 7; Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845
F.2d 1296.
117. How Investors Can Avoid the Bind of Binding Arbitration, Money Magazine, Sept.
1988, at 27.
118. North American Securities Arbitration Association [NASAA] Briefing Paper:
Oversight of Securities Arbitration (June 1988), at 1; see supra note 1.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1-2.
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State proposed legislation that was to become effective on January 1,
1989.122 Under this proposed law, the state of Massachusetts, acting
under its Blue Sky law authority over brokers and dealers in securities,
sought to control the circumstances under which a broker may require a
noninstitutional customer located in Massachusetts to arbitrate disputes
between them.123 Massachusetts believed that arbitration was very im-
portant, especially for settling complaints that deal with small amounts.
Massachusetts also believed, however, that arbitration should be a volun-
tary system; one that is fair, impartial, and open fo public scrutiny, in
addition to being inexpensive, accessible, and efficient .12
Before Massachusetts had a chance to see its new law take effect, the
United States District Court in Massachusetts, on December 19, 1988,
enjoined the Massachusetts Secretary of State from enforcing the stat-
ute. 25 The district court held that the Massachusetts law was preempted
by the FAA and that it violated the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion of the United States.126
In response to McMahon and the attempted Massachusetts legislation,
the North American Securities Arbitration Association (NASAA) devel-
oped a securities industry arbitration reform proposal. NASAA assigned
to an Ad Hoc Arbitration Committee (Committee) the task of evaluat-
ing the operation, efficiency, and fairness of securities arbitration. 2 This
Committee would recommend changes in the current securities arbitra-
tion system, and would create a proposed model regulation for future
attempts at state securities legislation. 28 Modificatipns of broker-cus-
tomer agreements and supervision of the arbitral process are steps which
must be taken now to insure the protection of investQrs in the future. It
is very possible that the Supreme Court took these pot-McMahon devel-
opments into consideration when it decided Rodriguez.
2. Arbitration: Settling For Less? Critical to the arpitrability issue are
the comparative advantages and disadvantages inhererlt in arbitration for
the plaintiff-investor. Arbitration has many positive aspects. Generally, it
is more time and cost efficient than traditional litigati n because it elimi-
nates the burdensome technicalities of litigation, such as the extremely
high cost, the extensive motion filings, the long wait for trial, and the
122. MAss. REGS. CODE TIT. 950, § 12:204(a)(2)(G)La-c (proposed Sept. 21, 1988)
(held to be preempted by Federal Arbitration Act in Securities Indus. Assoc. v. Connolly,
703 F. Supp. 146 (D.Mass. 1988).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Securities Indus. Assoc. v. Connolly, 703 F. Supp. 146.
126. Id.; see supra note 1.
127. NASAA Securities Arbitration Reform Proposal (June 1988)-.
128. Id.
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frustration commonly experienced by both sides.129 These are advantages
to both the broker and the investor. Another advantage of arbitration is
that the parties themselves can decide a hearing date, and once a hearing
date is set, most arbitrations are completed within a relatively short pe-
riod of time.13 Finally, an arbitrator knowledgeable in securities laws
can be selected by the parties, and this in turn can save them the extra
time and expense of educating a judge inexperienced in securities
matters. 131
A disadvantage of arbitration is that movement away from a federal
forum to an arbitral forum may produce a very different final result on
the same set of facts. Arbitration is a procedure that lacks a jury and a
judge's written opinion. 32 Arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evi-
dence and judicial review of an arbitrator's award is very limited.1 33
Even with these disadvantages, however, the arbitration procedure still
tends to resemble a trial. Both parties can call and cross-examine wit-
nesses under oath.134 In addition, parties can have a transcript of the
hearing made and subpoena documents just as in a court proceeding.13 5
The securities industry has established a structure for arbitration so
that the enforcement of contracts to arbitrate securities disputes will not
dilute the protection of investors under the securities laws. Under the
supervision of the SEC, the securities exchanges and the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) provide arbitration facilities
for disputes between investors and brokers.' 3 In addition, the securities
e~changes and the NASD each have permanent arbitration staffs and
constitutions with detailed rules of arbitration procedures.13 7
129. Robbins, A Practioner's Guide to Securities Dispute Resolution, 535 FRACTICING
L. INST. 17, 22-26 (1986).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See. e.g., 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH); 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) §§ 2600-38;
UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198,
203 (1956).
133. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203-04.
134. See. e.g., 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) §§ 9546, 9551(B); 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) § 2625; UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION §§ 15-16, 26.
135. See infra note 141.
136. Brief for the Securities Industry Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Petition, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros,, Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.
1988), at 8.
137. Id.; see. e.g., Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Art. VIII, 2
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) §§ 1351-57; Rules 600-634 of the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc., 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) §§ 2600-34; Code of Arbitration Procedure of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) §§ 3701-43; Arbitration
Rules of the American Stock Exchange, Inc., 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) §§ 9540-
95 1J.
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The SEC retains the jurisdiction to monitor the fairness of arbitration
proceedings. 138 This jurisdiction allows the SEC to regulate arbitration
procedures prescribed by self-regulatory organizations that enforce the
rights of investors.13 Furthermore, in order to avoid allegations of bias
among the arbitrators toward the securities industry, the stock exchanges
and the NASD keep permanent lists of available arbitrators.1 40 These
lists include senior securities industry personnel, lawyers, and other pro-
fessionals with experience in the field .14  Finally, the arbitration rules
require panels of arbitrators to include members of the public.14 2 These
rules are reinforced with a safeguard that requires arbitrators to disclose
any business affiliation with any of the parties involved in the dispute.143
If there is a hint of conflict of interest, the arbitrator is automatically
disqualified for cause. 44
IV. RODRIGUEZ DE QUIJAS v. SHEARSON/AMERICAN ExPRESS, INC.
A. Facts
The petitioners in Rodriguez were four individual first-time inves-
tors. 145 In 1982, they began a financial relationship with Shearson/Leh-
138. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s (1982).
139. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), at 8.
140. See, e.g., Panel of Arbitrators 1986-1987, 1 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) §§ 157-
59; N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) § 3702; see also Brief of the Securities Industry Association
as Amicus Curiae, in Support of the Petition, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman
Bros. Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, at 9.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) § 9541 (Rule 601); N.A.S.D. Manual
(CCH) § 3719; 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) § 2607 (Rule 607); UNIFORM CODE OF ARBI-
TRATION § 8. These rules also require a majority of "public" arbitrators (i.e., unaffiliated
with member firms) in disputes between public customers and member firms unless cus-
tomer requests otherwise.
143. See, e.g., 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) § 9542(f) (Rule 602(f)); N.A.S.D. Man-
ual (CCH) § 3723; 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) § 2610 (Rule 610); UNIFORM CODE OF
ARBITRATION § 11.
144. See, e.g., 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) § 9542(f) (Rule 602(f)); N.A.S.D. Man-
ual (CCH)Y § 3723; 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) § 2610 (Rule 610); UNIFORM CODE OF
ARBITRATION § 11.
145. The four complaints filed by petitioners in the district court were consolidated for
the purposes of appeal. The arbitration orders of the district court and court of appeals
were identical for all four complaints. Brief for Respondent at 2 n.2, Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/ Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1988). The petitioners claim in
their brief on the merits that no explanation was- given to them about the customer agree-
ment, which was allegedly presented to them face down with only check marks indicating
where to sign. In addition, petitioners alleged that they frequently complained to the
Shearson broker about the monthly investment statements because they were unintelligible
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man Brothers, Inc. [hereinafter "Shearson"], and one of its financial
consultants, Jon Grady Deaton.'" Upon opening their brokerage ac-
counts with Shearson, the petitioners were each asked to sign a Cus-
tomer Agreement with Shearson. Each of these agreements contained a
predispute arbitration provision which stated that should any dispute
arise pertaining to the petitioners' accounts with Shearson, it would be
settled by arbitration.147
In 1985, the petitioners all suffered financial losses as a result of al-
leged excessive unauthorized trading in their accounts and by false state-
ments and omissions of material facts in the advice given to them by the
Shearson broker. 4 The Rodriguez de Quijas family lost approximately
$190,000; Mary Grace Norman lost approximately $38,000; Adelina
Trapero lost $100,000; and Gene and Gertrude Griffin lost $80,000.'4 9
The petitioners filed individual complaints against Shearson and its bro-
ker Deaton in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas."'0 The complaints alleged violations of sections 12(2) and 17(a)
of the Securities Act, sections 10(b), 15(c)(1), and 15(c)(2) of the Ex-
change Act, and rules 1Ob-5, 15ci-2, 15cl-4, and 15cl-6 promulgated
thereunder, RICO, as well as common law claims of misrepresentation,
fraud, and breach of contract.151 Shearson moved to compel arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration clause contained in each of the Customer
Agreements and in accordance with the FAA.'52
These individual suits were consolidated before the district court.1 5
3
The district court granted Shearson's motion to stay proceedings pending
to them. They were told to simply trust the broker. Brief for the Petitioners at 2-3, Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc.. 845 F.2d 1296.
146. Jon Grady Deaton, a defendant below, was not a party to the appeal before the
Fifth Circuit or to Supreme Court proceeding because default judgments %ere entered
against him in the district court. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
sop/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296.
147. The arbitration agreements were entered into by the parties pursuant to § 3 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The predispute arbitration clauses in the
customer agreements were stated as follows:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or
relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in
effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Di-
rectors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Ex-
change, Inc. as I [the customer] may elect.
Rodriguez, 845 F.2d 1296, 1297 n.2.
148. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1297.
149. Id.
150. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., No. B-85-360 (S.D.Texas
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arbitration of all the petitioners' claims except the claims under the Se-
curities Act."" The district court judge based his decision not to enforce
the arbitration clause with respect to the Securities Act claims entirely
on Wilko.'55
In the appeal of this case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
fronted the issue of whether predispute arbitration agreements can be
litigated under section 12(2) of the Securities Act.156 In its very brief
analysis, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court.
The court relied on McMahon57 and concluded that the Supreme
Court's majority opinion in McMahon mandated enforcing a valid agree-
ment to arbitrate claims . 5 The court of appeals in Rodriguez believed-
that similarities in the language of sections 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and 12(2) of the Securities Act and the McMahon decision collectively
undermined Wilko, thus precluding Wilko's application to Rodriguez. 59
Therefore, the court of appeals found section 12(2) claims to be arbitra-
ble, notwithstanding the earlier contrary precedent of Wilko."' On No-
vember 14, 1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
Rodriguez.
B. Majority
On May 15, 1989, in a five-to-four split, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Fifth Circuit's decision to apply the rationale of McMahon to claims
brought under the Securities Act. 6" On behalf of the Court's majority,
Justice Kennedy held that predispute agreements to arbitrate claims
were enforceable under section 12(2) of the Securities Act,'6 ' and more
154. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., No. B-85-360 (S.D. Tex.
filed Nov. 18, 1986). The district court ruled that the petitioners' § 10(b) claims under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were arbitrable, but that their § 12(2) claims under the
Securities Act of 1933 were not. The court's decision to arbitrate the § 10(b) claims was
based on Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), which held
that agreements to arbitrate asserted under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and RICO were
enforceable.
155. See supra notes 13-20, 60-73 and accompanying text. Wilko held that an agree-
ment to arbitrate a § 12(2) claim under the Securities Act of 1933 was prohibited by § 14
of the Act, as an agreement to waive the jurisdictional provision of the Act.
156. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.),
reh'g en bane denied, 850 F.2d 1582 (1988) (per curiam). The court of appeals denied
petitioners' motion for an en bane rehearing of its- opinion of June 22, 1988.
157. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220.
158. Rodriguez de Quijas, v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1298-99.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 1917 (1989).
162. Id.
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importantly, that federal courtrooms were no longer the exclusive judi-
cial forums for resolving such disputes. Consequently, this holding
culminated in what was ultimately the beginning of the end of Wilko.a"s
The Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez analyzed the conclusions
it had made in Wilko concerning its interpretations of the Securities Act,
and why those conclusions no longer justify its outcome in Wilko. The
Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the Court's subsequent deci-
sions reduced Wilko to "obsolescence.""1 The Court stated that the leg-
islative history and case decisions surrounding its interpretation of the
Securities and Exchange Acts since Wilko made it impossible for the
Court to support its decision in Wilko any longer.1"5 For example, since
the Court's decision in Wilko twenty-six years earlier, the SEC's author-
ity to oversee and regulate arbitration procedures has expanded. 6
Moreover, the strong language of the FAA establishes that arbitration is
an alternative method of dispute resolution which provides the same pro-
tection investors are afforded under the Securities Act.167 Therefore,
under this holding, all cases involving predispute agreements to arbitrate
are enforceable without undermining the substantive rights that protect
investors under the Securities and Exchange Acts. 6"
Before disposing of Wilko, the Court explained the two main reasons
for its original holding in favor of the Securities Act rather than the
FAA. First, it found that because the Securities Act offered a variety of
jpdicial forums, the "right" to choose a forum was a valuable feature of
the Securities Act that should be protected."6 9 This right, as translated
by the Court, meant that the right to choose a court did not also include
tjie right to choose an arbitral forum.170 The Court stated that the sec-
ond reason for its decision in Wilko was that an arbitration 4id not re-
semble a trial closely enough to be considered a judicial forum under the
§ecurities Act.' The Court admitted it had been insecure about the
163. Id. at 1920.
164. Id. at 1919 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d
1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1988)).
165. Id. at 1922 ("It also would be undesirable for the decisions in Wilko and McMa-
hon to exist side by side.").
166. Id. at 1921 (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
231-34 (1987)).
167. Id. at 1921 (Section 2 of the FAA grants relief where a party opposing arbitration
can show that the arbitration agreement was the result of fraud or overwhelming economic
power that would make the contract revocable); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S 614, 627 (1985)).
168. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 1917, 1921
(1989).
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arbitral system in 1953, and this insecurity influenced its ultimate con-
clusion that arbitration could not sufficiently protect the investors'
rights.17
Upon reviewing reasons in conjunction with the rationale of past deci-
sions, the Court concluded that Wilko was an example of England's past
judicial hostility toward arbitration. 17 3 Cases since Wilko, however,
demonstrate the erosion of this hostility, and a shift by the Court in the
direction of arbitration. The Court recognized that "[b]y agreeing to ar-
bitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial forum."' 7"
Upon this realization, the Court changed its focus to the distinctions it
made in Wilko between substantive and procedural provisions of the Se-
curities Act.17" The Court stated that it had improperly focused on
whether a provision was waived by the parties, and that the Court's ap-
proach should have focused on what kind of provision was being waived
and whether the investor remained on equal footing with the seller. 7 6
According to section 14 of the Securities Act, substantive provisions,
such as who has the burden of proof, cannot be waived; otherwise, the
purpose of the Act would falter. 7 7 The procedural provisions, however,
such as service of process and venue, can be properly waived without
harm to the investor.17 8 The investor is still on equal footing with the
seller because of the safeguard of concurrent jurisdiction. 79 Moreover,
the Court relied on its other decisions to enforce prqdispute arbitration
clauses under other federal statutes. 80
The Rodriguez majority wanted to maintain the legal maxim of con-
sistency. However, so long as Wilko and McMahon cpntinued to coexist,
there could be no consistency in securities law.' 8' Investors would be able
to continue to forum shop between courts and arbitral forums depending
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
175. Id.; see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
176. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 1917, 1920
(1989).
177. Id.
178. Id. (There is no sound basis for construing the prohibition in § 14 on waiving
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JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
upon the securities act under which they filed their claim. The Supreme
Court knew that something had to give, and that something was Wilko.
C. Dissent
Unlike Justice Blackmun's strong dissent in McMahon,182 Justice
Steven's dissenting opinion in Rodriguez was brief and almost apa-
thetic.183 Rather than reiterating the majority's faulty analysis, as was
done in McMahon,18 the dissent in Rodriguez simply expressed that it
knew that it had finally lost the securities arbitration war on policy
grounds. The dissent still believed that the Court's interpretation of a
congressional Act in Wilko twenty-six years earlier was sound, and that
although many strong arguments existed in favor of arbitration, all of
them combined still could not create enough weight to overturn
precedent.185
The dissent still believes it is 1953, and it still harbors deeply rooted
judicial hostility toward arbitration. But, as stated at the introduction of
this Note, times have changed considerably since Wilko, and arbitration
is a result of the times. The majority in Rodriguez and McMahon based
a substantial amount of its rationale on the fact that arbitration is not
what it used to be. The Court emphasized that "[t]o the extent that
Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the
protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it
has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the
federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."' 86 It seems
clear that the Supreme Court is finally ready to not only allow arbitra-
tion under the Securities and Exchange Acts, but to encourage it.
182. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (Black-
mun, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part).
183. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 1917, 1922
(1989) (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
184. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 243-50. The McMa-
hon dissent identifed three faults in the majority's opinion. First, that Wilko was read too
narrowly, and that it properly stood for the fact that the text and legislative history of the
Securities Act are why claims should be excluded from the FAA, not because of general
problems with arbitration; second, that the problems of securities industry bias and arbitra-
tion procedure still existed; and third, that congressional amendments to the Exchange Act
subsequent to the Wilko decision demonstrated Congress' approval of Wilko on Exchange
Act claims.
185. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 1917, 1923.
186. Id. at 1920.
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V. CONCLUSION
The ramifications of the Rodriguez decision are significant because it
is now evident that the Court no longer harbors the fear of arbitration it
had in Wilko. 8 7 In the wake of Rodriguez, the predispute agreement to
arbitrate is enforceable for claims arising under both the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act. Similarities between the two Acts, along with the
Court's current favorable attitude toward arbitration, indicated that the
Court in Rodriguez would overrule Wilko. Moreover, the similar lan-
guage found in the two Acts, as well as their common goal of investor
protection, further supports the conclusion that Wilko's rationale should
no longer apply. It seems clear that if arbitration is an adequate and fair
forum for the resolution of Exchange Act and RICO claims, it should
also be an adequate and fair forum for claims arising under the Securi-
ties Act.
Jean Rowley Robertson
187. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220. 243. The dissenting
opinion in McMahon recognized that "the Court effectively overrule[d] Wilko."

